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PRESUMED CONSENT TO ORGAN DONATION:
ITS RISE AND FALL IN THE UNITED STATES
David Orentlicher*
As the gap between the need for organ transplants and the supply
of organs has increasingly widened, many scholars have urged the
adoption of "presumed consent" to organ donation. Under a
presumed consent regime, the state would assume that a person
agreed to organ donation after death unless the person (or a family
member) had lodged an objection to posthumous organ donation.
Such an assumption would reverse existing law--currently, it is
generally the case that organ donation requires actual consent from
the donor or a family member of the donor.
For some forty years in a little-known experiment, the United
States tried presumed consent on a limited basis. In many states,
when dead persons came .under the custody of coroners or medical
examiners, those officials could authorize cornea donation-or even
organ donation-in the absence of a known objection to the donation
by the decedent or a family member. However, in 2006, the Revised
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act recommended against presumed
consent, and most states have followed its lead.
This Article reviews the history of presumed consent in the
United States and concludes that presumed consent failed because it
could not overcome the major reason why people do not become
organ donors after death-the refusal of family members to give
consent to donation. To the extent that presumed consent allowed
family members to overcome the presumption and withhold consent,
it did not address the reasons why family members say no. To the
extent that professionals tried to preserve the presumption by
bypassing families, they validated fears that doctors will be too
quick to take organs from dead persons who would not have wanted
their organs removed. The United States's history with presumed
consent indicates that other proposed reforms will be needed to
address the shortage of organs for transplantation.
* Samuel R. Rosen Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-
Indianapolis; Adjunct Professor, Indiana University School of Medicine. J.D., Harvard
Law School, 1986; M.D., Harvard Medical School, 1981. I am grateful for the
comments of Jennifer Bard, Judy Failer, and Jenny Girod, and the research assistance
of Robin Bandy and Megan Tortorich.
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INTRODUCTION
Proponents of "presumed consent" to organ donation have always
faced an uphill battle. In supporting a presumption that people want
to donate their organs after death-and a policy of organ removal in
the absence of an objection by decedents or their family-advocates
push a policy that goes against the grain of American individualism
and is more at home in countries with a stronger communitarian
ethic.1 Presumed consent also raises the specter of one of society's
deepest fears-that unscrupulous doctors will take a person's heart,
liver, kidneys, or other organs against the person's wishes, or even
hasten a person's death to obtain the organs. Consider in this regard
1. Presumed consent laws, in fact, are common in Western European countries
like Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, and Sweden. Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for
Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 69, 125-26 (2004); see also Anke Janssen & Sjef Gevers, Explicit or Presumed
Consent and Organ Donation Post-Mortem: Does It Matter?, 24 MED. & L. 575, 578
(2005).
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the resonance of Robin Cook's Coma,2 the best-selling thriller in
which doctors put patients into a coma so their organs could be
removed for transplantation, or a popular episode of the television
series, Law & Order, in which a man was kidnapped and left in a
park after his kidney was taken.3
While the United States has tried presumed consent on a very
limited basis for roughly four decades, recent developments in the
law suggest that even this highly limited use is being abandoned.
Presumed consent appears to have failed because it went either too
far or not far enough. It did not go far enough to the extent that
family members were allowed to overcome the presumption that the
dead person favored donation. By permitting families to reject
donation, presumed consent did not address the major reason why
people do not become organ donors after death-the refusal of family
members to give consent. On the other hand, presumed consent went
too far to the extent that public officials bypassed family members
and avoided the possibility that they would refuse consent. Such
action only validated fears that the desire for more organs for
transplantation would result in organs being taken from dead
persons who would not have wanted their organs removed.
Presumed consent, in short, faced a Catch-22. If implemented in
a way that was acceptable to the public, it could not solve the organ
shortage. If implemented in a way that might alleviate the organ
shortage, it became unacceptable to the public.
To be sure, presumed consent was designed to address a serious
shortfall in transplantable organs in the United States. Each year,
thousands of Americans receive the "gift of life" when they undergo
transplant surgery. Donor hearts, lungs, livers, and kidneys save
people when their own organs have failed and they face a shortened
lifespan, if not imminent death.4 At the same time, however, many
more people wait for a life-saving organ transplant, and thousands of
individuals die while waiting. Nearly 100,000 people are on a wait
2. ROBIN COOK, COMA (1977).
3. Law & Order: Sonata for a Solo Organ (NBC television broadcast Apr. 2,
1991); see also Joe Morgenstern, A Script Recipe: One Kidney, Lots of Writers, Beat
Well, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1991, at B25 (describing the writing of the script for the
episode). Kidney theft is a common urban myth in the United States. JAN HAROLD
BRUNVAND, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF URBAN LEGENDS, 227-28 (2002).
4. Kidneys may not seem to be life-saving given the availability of dialysis to
provide artificial kidney function. However, life expectancy is longer for persons who
receive a kidney transplant than for persons who remain on dialysis. Gabriel C.
Oniscu et al., Impact of Cadaveric Renal Transplantation on Survival in Patients
Listed for Transplantation, 16 J. AM. Soc. NEPHROLOGY 1859, 1862 (2005). One study
found a tripling of life expectancy with a transplant. Id. at 1859, 1864 (reporting life
expectancy with dialysis at less than six years compared with more than seventeen
years with a transplant).
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list for an organ in the United States, but fewer than 30,000 organs
are transplanted each year, and more than 6000 people die every
year while waiting for a transplant.5 Moreover, the gap between need
and supply grows larger every year. Between 1988 and 2006, the
number of transplants more than doubled, but the wait list grew
roughly six-fold.6
The gap between need and supply need not be so large.
According to conservative estimates, roughly twice as many organs
would be available each year if consent to donation were obtained for
every person who dies and whose organs are viable for
transplantation.7 Many of these persons would have wanted to
donate their organs, but consent was not obtained. People often do
not consider the question of posthumous donation while still alive,
physicians may fail to ask family members for surrogate consent, or
family members withhold consent to donation even when the dead
person would have preferred to be a donor.
To capture the organs that could be transplanted but are lost for
lack of consent, many scholars have urged broad adoption of
presumed consent to donation.8 Under a presumed consent regime,
the state would assume that a dead person has consented to the
posthumous donation of organs unless an objection has been lodged
either by the person while alive or by a family member after the
5. DAVID ORENTLICHER ET AL., BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAw 356-57 (2d
ed. 2008).
6. Id. at 357.
7. Francis L. Delmonico et al., Organ Donation and Utilization in the United
States, 2004, 5 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 862, 863 tbl.1 (2005) (reporting 12,031
eligible deceased donors and 6630 consents for donation in the United States in 2003);
Ellen Sheehy et al., Estimating the Number of Potential Organ Donors in the United
States, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 667, 671 (2003) (reporting that less than half of eligible
donors became donors). Other estimates suggest that organ transplants could more
than quintuple if all usable organs were transplanted. COMM. ON INCREASING RATES
OF ORGAN DONATION, ORGAN DONATION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION 6, 127 (James T.
Childress & Catharyn T. Liverman eds., 2006) (estimating as many as 16,800 potential
donors from brain death and another 22,000 potential donors from persons who die
from cardiac arrest).
8. Arthur L. Caplan, Organ Transplants: The Costs of Success, 13(6) HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 23, 27-28 (1983); Jesse Dukeminier, Jr. & David Sanders, Organ
Transplantation: A Proposal for Routine Salvaging of Cadaver Organs, 279 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 413, 416-19 (1968); Michael B. Gill, Presumed Consent, Autonomy, and Organ
Donation, 29 J. MED. & PHILOSOPHY 37, 37-38 (2004); James L. Muyskens, An
Alternative Policy for Obtaining Cadaver Organs for Transplantation, 8 PHILOSOPHY &
PUB. AFF. 88, 98-99 (1978); see also Theodore Silver, The Case for a Post-Mortem
Organ Draft and a Proposed Model Organ Draft Act, 68 B.U. L. REV. 681, 681 (1988)
(proposing legislation that would empower the state to take organs for transplantation
after a person's death, with objections to removal recognized only when based on
religious belief).
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person's death.9 Such a presumption would reverse the law's existing
presumption. For the most part, laws in the fifty states assume a
person has not consented to organ donation in the absence of actual
consent by the person or by a family member.O In other words,
presumed consent would replace an "opt-in" system for organ
donation with an "opt-out" system.1 1 Instead of placing the burden on
health care professionals to obtain consent, the burden would be on
individuals and their families to document their objections.
While the law has generally eschewed presumed consent, many
states employed presumed consent on a limited basis for a number of
years. Starting in the late 1960s, states began to authorize retrieval
of corneas and other eye tissues,12 pituitary glands, and sometimes
any tissues or organs (including hearts, lungs, livers, and kidneys)
from dead persons who came under the custody of coroners or
medical examiners.13 Since these people would be undergoing an
autopsy to determine the cause of death, their bodies already would
9. There is some dispute about terms in the debate over presumed consent. As
some have argued, it is misleading to characterize these statutes as "presuming
consent" of donors. Rather, according to this view, the laws really are routine retrieval
or routine salvaging statutes that ignore considerations of a person's intent unless the
person-or a family member-actually expresses an unwillingness to donate. R.M.
Veatch & J.B. Pitt, The Myth of Presumed Consent: Ethical Problems in New Organ
Procurement Strategies, 27 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 1888, 1888 (1995). Some
proponents of presumed consent use the routine retrieval or routine salvaging
language. Dukeminier & Sanders, supra note 8, at 416, 418-19. Another term used for
some of these statutes is "legislative consent." Michele Goodwin, Rethinking
Legislative Consent Law?, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 257, 272-73 (2002).
The different terms reflect the fact that different approaches are possible besides a
requirement of explicit consent. COMM. ON INCREASING RATES OF ORGAN DONATION,
supra note 7, at 209-12. One can presume consent but allow either the decedent or a
family member to overcome the presumption. Id. at 210-11. Or, one could allow only
the decedent to overcome the presumption of consent. Id. If the family is permitted to
overcome the presumption, then the law could either require that doctors consult with
the family or only require doctors to take account of objections of which they are
aware. Id. at 211. Finally, the law could call for routine removal of organs, regardless
of the decedent's or family's wishes, with an exception for objections based on religious
beliefs. Id.
10. See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
11. Id.
12. Although corneas are technically tissues, organ donation law typically
characterizes them as organs. Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86
VA. L. REV. 163, 184 (2000). An organ is a relatively independent part of the body that
carries out specific functions (e.g., eye, heart, lung, liver, kidney, pancreas, stomach).
Each organ is composed of several tissues that perform the organ's functions. An eye
has a cornea, a lens, a retina, and other tissues, for example.
13. See id. at 176-77. An early proposal for presumed consent came from David
Sanders & Jesse Dukeminier, Jr., Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and
Kidney Transplantation, 15 UCLA L. REV. 357, 410-13 (1968).
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be subjected to a major intrusion. 14 Retrieving some tissues or organs
at the same time to provide great benefit to living persons had an
obvious attraction to lawmakers.
Under these presumed consent statutes, coroners or medical
examiners could authorize the donation of the tissues or organs as
long as they were not aware of an objection by the person or a family
member.15 The 1987 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (1987 UAGA)
reinforced this trend in presumed consent statutes when it
recommended presumed consent for the donation of any organ or
tissue from cadavers under the custody of coroners or medical
examiners.16 At one time or another, more than two-thirds of the
states adopted presumed consent statutes.17
However, the 2006 Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (2006
UAGA) has eliminated the presumed consent provisions of the 1987
UAGA and now recommends retrieval of corneas, other tissues, and
organs only when there is actual consent by the dead person or by a
family member of the decedent.18 States have quickly taken up the
2006 UAGA, with thirty-three states and the District of Columbia
passing the 2006 UAGA in either 2007 or 2008.19 To be sure, some of
14. Interestingly, some state statutes authorized presumed consent only when an
autopsy was being performed, while other state statutes authorized presumed consent
when the decedent was under the custody of a coroner or medical examiner. Compare
ALA. CODE § 22-19-54 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005) (autopsy not required), with MD. CODE
ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-509.1 (LexisNexis 2001) (autopsy required). Since coroners
and medical examiners do not autopsy everyone under their custody, it is possible for
organs to be taken in the absence of an autopsy.
15. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.9213 (West 2006) (authorizing removal of
organs from dead persons under the custody of coroners or medical examiners in the
absence of a known objection to donation), repealed by Darlene Luther Revised
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 2007 Minn. Laws, ch. 120, § 26 (codified as MINN. STAT.
§ 525A.01-25 (2008)).
16. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4 (1987).
17. Goodwin, supra note 9, at 274-75, 278 (recognizing passage in twenty-eight
states); see also ALA. CODE § 22-19-54 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-
2-16-1 (West 1994 & Supp. 2008); IOWA CODE § 142C.4A (West 2005 & Supp. 2008);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.9213 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 291-
A:5 (1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-6A-4 (LexisNexis 2000); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 97.956
(West 2002 & Supp. 2008). Despite the authorization to take organs in the absence of
an objection, presumed consent statutes have been used much more regularly with
corneas and other eye tissues than to retrieve hearts, lungs, livers, or kidneys. See
Goodwin, supra note 9, at 266. For the most part, transplant programs are not
comfortable using organs without actual consent. See, e.g., id. at 275-76.
18. REV. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFrACT § 8(2006).
19. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act (2006), Enactment Status Map,
http://www.anatomicalgiftact.orgtDesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=2&tabid=72 (last
visited Apr. 6, 2009). In 2009, as this Articles goes to press, the 2006 UAGA has been
enacted in a thirty-fourth state, has passed both houses in another state, and is being
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those states have retained presumed consent at least for corneas if
not for organs,20 but we are now seeing a major retrenchment in the
use of presumed consent in the United States.21
This Article reviews the history of presumed consent in the
United States and considers the implications of the apparent
abandonment of such an approach for increasing the supply of organs
for transplantation.
Part I of the Article documents the rise of presumed consent in
the United States, Part II discusses the abandonment of presumed
consent, and Part III analyzes the reasons why presumed consent is
being discarded as a way to address the shortage of organs for
transplantation. The Article concludes with observations on the
kinds of reforms that would be successful in addressing the organ
shortage.
considered in six more states. Id.
20. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 36-2-14-19 (West 2006 & Supp. 2008) (corneas);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-412.3 (2008) (corneas); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 157.06 (West Supp.
2008) (organs).
21. Georgia, Minnesota, New Mexico, and North Dakota are among the states that
have followed the 2006 UAGA in revoking their grants of authority to coroners and
medical examiners. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-23-6(b) (2006), repealed by 2008 Ga. Laws 545
§ 3 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-140 to -159.4 (2008)); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
525.9213 (West 2006) repealed by 2007 Minn. Laws ch. 120, § 26 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 525A.01-25 (2008)); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-6A-4 (LexisNexis 2000), repealed by
2007 N.M. Laws ch. 323, § 35 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-6B-1 to -25 (LexisNexis
2008)); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.2-04 (2002), repealed by 2007 N.D. Laws ch. 237, § 7
(codified in scattered sections of the N.D. CENT. CODE (2007)). Other states include
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia. ALA. CODE § 22-19-54 (LexisNexis 1997), repealed
by 2008 Ala. Laws 453, § 1 (codified at ALA. CODE § 22-19-160 to -181 (LexisNexis
2008)); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-844 (West 2003), amended by 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws
ch, 281, § 3; ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-601 to -613 (LexisNexis 2006), repealed by 2007
Ark. Acts 839, § 6 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17 (LexisNexis 2008)); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7151 (West 2007), repealed by 2007 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv.
ch. 629, § 2 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7150-.40 (West Supp. 2008));
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327-4 (LexisNexis 2007), repealed by 2008 Haw. Sess. Laws
ch. 122, § 54 (codified at HAW. REV. STAT. § 327-4 (2008)); IDAHO CODE ANN. §39-3413
(LexisNexis 2002 & 2005 Supp.), amended by 2007 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 30, § 2; IOWA
CODE 142c.4A (LexisNexis 2002), amended by 2007 Iowa Acts ch. 44, § 5; OR. REV.
STAT. § 97.950 (West 2004), repealed by 2007 Or. Laws ch. 681, § 31 (codified at OR.
REV. STAT. 97.951-.982 (West Supp. 2008)); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-18.6-4 (LexisNexis
2001), repealed by 2007 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 476, § 1 (codified at R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-
18.6.1-1 to -25 (2008)); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-28-5 (1998), repealed by 2007 Utah Laws
60, § 34 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN., § 26-28-101 to -125 (2008)); VA. CODE ANN. §
32.1-290 (2004), repealed by 2007 Va. Acts 92, § 907 (codified in scattered sections of
the VA. CODE ANN. (2008)); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-19-1 to -14 (LexisNexis 2001 &
Supp. 2005), repealed by 2008 W. Va. Acts 191 (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-19-1
to -23 (2008)).
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I. THE RISE OF PRESUMED CONSENT IN THE UNITED STATES
Presumed consent statutes first appeared in the late 1960s as a
way to address the serious shortage of corneas, pituitary glands, and
organs for transplantation or other therapeutic uses. 22 Corneas may
not be life-saving in the way a heart or liver is, but they can restore
eyesight in people with injured or diseased corneas, or provide
eyesight to infants born without functioning corneas. 23 While corneas
and organs are used for transplantation, the pituitary glands were
used as a source of growth hormone for medical treatment.24 Once a
synthetic form of growth hormone was developed in 1985, it replaced
natural growth hormone because of the risks of transmitting
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease from the donor of the pituitary gland
tissue to the recipient of the growth hormone infusion.25
With the exception of a California statute that applied to
patients in hospitals,26 the presumed consent statutes limited their
application to cadavers under the custody of coroners or medical
examiners.27 Most of the early statutes were restricted to cornea or
22. Among the early states to adopt presumed consent were Hawaii in 1967 (any
tissue) and Virginia in 1968 (any organ). See Jesse Dukeminier, Jr., Supplying Organs
for Transplantation, 68 MICH. L. REV. 811, 843 (1970) (describing statute passed in
Hawaii in 1967, now codified in the last sentence of HAW. REV. STAT. § 841-14 (2008));
Michael McH. Collins, Note, Organ Transplantation and the Donation: A Proposal for
Legislation, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 975, 982-83 & n.42 (1969) (citing 1968 Virginia
presumed consent statute).
23. State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1190-91 (Fla. 1986).
24. For people who suffer from a deficiency of growth hormone and experience
unusually short stature and other effects, replacement therapy is an important
treatment to compensate for the lack of the hormone. See DENNIS STYNE, Growth, in
GREENSPAN'S BASIC & CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY 197, 197 (David G. Gardner &
Dolores Shoback eds., 8th ed. 2007). Growth hormone also is used to increase the
height of children who have normal levels of growth hormone but still are very short,
and for other therapeutic purposes unrelated to height. David B. Allen, Growth
Hormone Therapy for Short Stature: Is the Benefit Worth the Burden?, 118 PEDIATRICS
343, 343 (2006); Marie Gelato et al., Role of Recombinant Human Growth Hormone in
HIV-Associated Wasting and Cachexia: Pathophysiology and Rationale for Treatment,
29 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 2269, 2279 (2007).
25. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease is a degenerative neurologic disorder, akin to "mad
cow" disease, that was diagnosed in patients who had received human growth hormone
donations many years earlier. STYNE, supra note 24, at 197.
26. Before adopting the 2006 UAGA, California allowed removal of organs in the
absence of objection or consent when someone died in the hospital and the hospital
was unable to locate a family member, guardian, or health care agent, as long as the
hospital made a reasonable effort for at least twelve hours to locate a representative of
the decedent. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7151.5(b) (West 2007).
27. In some jurisdictions, decedents undergoing state-required autopsies are under
the custody of a public health officer rather than a coroner or medical examiner.
Hence, the 1987 UAGA and many state statutes give public health officers the ability
to authorize organ or tissue retrieval. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4 (1987).
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pituitary gland retrieval, and the impact of the presumed consent
statutes was dramatic in some states. Georgia adopted its cornea
retrieval statute in 1978, and the number of cornea transplants in
the state jumped from 25 in 1977 to 1000 in 1984.28 Florida enacted
its statute in 1977, and cornea transplants increased from 500 in
1975 to 3000 in 1984.29 Texas saw an increase from an average of 215
cornea transplants a year to more than 1300 transplants a year after
adopting its statute in 1977.30 In Alabama, presumed consent
resulted in the state having more corneas than it needed for
transplantation. 31
While potentially very effective, presumed consent statutes are
controversial and not universally accepted. In many cities and states,
coroners and medical examiners did not exercise their presumed
consent authority. This was especially the case with respect to
organs, which have rarely been removed by coroners or medical
examiners under their presumed consent authority,32 but often also
with respect to corneas. In Kentucky, for example, medical
professionals and eye bank officials did not support presumed
consent for cornea retrieval, and that state's statute did not achieve
In theory, the limitation to coroner or medical examiner cases need not have been
limiting. More than half of potential organ donors after death come under the custody
of coroners or medical examiners. See infra text accompanying note 164. However,
many coroners and medical examiners have been reluctant to exercise their authority
to employ presumed consent. Goodwin, supra note 9, at 274-75 (reporting that
coroners and medical examiners in only nine states took tissues or organs on the basis
of presumed consent).
28. Ga. Lions Eye Bank v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985).
29. State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 1986).
30. Emile J. Farge et al., The Impact of State Legislation on Eye Banking, 112
ARCHIVES OPHTHALMOLOGY 180, 181 (1994).
31. Goodwin, supra note 9, at 277.
32. Data do not appear to be available on the number of organs that have been
retrieved, and there have been only occasional reports. The court in Jacobsen v. Marin
General Hospital decided a lawsuit by a family that sued over the removal of a
decedent's heart, liver, kidney, and pancreas by the coroner in Marin County,
California, without the family's permission. 192 F.3d 881, 884 (9th Cir. 1999). The
Marin County coroner reports that there have not been any times since the Jacobsen
case in which a decedent's organs were removed under the Marin County coroner's
presumed consent authority. Telephone Interview with Kenneth Holmes, Marin
County, Cal. Coroner (June 16, 2008); see also Jennifer Rutherford-McClure, To
Donate or Not to Donate Your Organs: Texas Can Decide for You When You Cannot
Decide for Yourself, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 241, 260-61 (2000) (describing the
removal of five organs from a person in Fort Worth, Texas who was unidentified at the
time of death but later was identified through fingerprint matching); Prerna Mona
Khanna, Scarcity of Organs for Transplant Sparks a Move to Legalize Financial
Incentives, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1992, at Bi (reporting that coroners in Texas exercised
their authority only twice in the first year after the state enacted its presumed consent
statute).
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the results seen in Georgia, Florida, Texas, or Alabama. 33 Members
of the public have objected to presumed consent, too, and sued after
discovering that corneas or organs were taken from their family
members without consent.
Nevertheless, courts at first staunchly defended the laws. In
three leading cases involving cornea removal statutes, the courts
rejected the challenges by family members. The Michigan Court of
Appeals upheld that state's cornea removal statute in 1984, finding
no constitutional rights at stake.34 One year later, the Georgia
Supreme Court quickly dismissed the possibility that any
constitutional rights were being violated, and observed further that
there is no more important power for the state than to protect the
public health.35 Accordingly, wrote the court, the presumed consent
statute 'must be submitted to by individuals for the good of the
public."'36 Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court upheld its state's
presumed consent statute in 1986, finding no constitutional rights at
stake and great benefit from the statute for the citizens of Florida. 37
In view of the evidence of effectiveness and the receptivity of the
courts, the drafters of the UAGA gave their blessing to presumed
consent in 1987, though with one important qualification.38 While
many presumed consent statutes permitted retrieval of corneas,
pituitary glands, or organs as long as the coroner or medical
examiner was simply unaware of objections to donation, the 1987
UAGA required the coroner or other official to make a "reasonable
effort" to review the dead person's medical records and speak to
family members before implementing presumed consent. 39 Some
states followed the 1987 UAGA and included the reasonable effort
language while others did not.40
33. Goodwin, supra note 9, at 275-76. The lack of support reflected not only
concerns about individual autonomy but also about the need to obtain a medical
history of the donor from the next of kin. Id. at 268. Donor tissue can carry
communicable diseases, and medical testing cannot identify all infected tissues. Id. A
medical history can indicate when a particular donor is at high risk for carrying a
communicable disease. Id. at 283-84. In its regulations for organ and tissue donation,
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires both medical testing and the taking
of a medical history, but waives the requirement of a medical history when corneas are
retrieved from cadavers under state presumed consent statutes. 21 C.F.R. § 1270.21
(2008).
34. Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
35. Ga. Lions Eye Bank v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128-29 (Ga. 1985).
36. Id. at 129 (quoting Abel v. State, 13 S.E.2d 507, 511 (Ga. 1941)).
37. State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1190-94 (Fla. 1986).
38. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4 cmt. (1987).
39. Id. § 4(a)(2).
40. Compare IND. CODE § 36-2-14-19(d)(4)(A) (2008) (requiring a reasonable effort
to contact next of kin within six hours of the person's death), with FLA. STAT. §
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Other differences emerged among the states. Some permitted
retrieval of any organ or tissue; others restricted retrieval to corneas
and/or pituitary glands (even though pituitary gland tissue has not
been used for therapeutic purposes since 1985).41 Some states
permitted retrieval of organs or tissues from any decedent under the
custody of a coroner or medical examiner; others permitted retrieval
only if an autopsy was being performed.42
By 1990, presumed consent reached its peak in the United
States. Most states had passed statutes and courts were in
agreement on the constitutionality of the provisions.
II. THE UNRAVELING OF PRESUMED CONSENT IN THE UNITED STATES
The legal tide against presumed consent began to turn in 1991,
when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit expressed
concerns about taking corneas from cadavers without family
members having some opportunity to be heard on the matter. 43 In
Brotherton v. Cleveland, Deborah Brotherton sued when she found
out from an autopsy report that her husband's corneas had been
removed.44 Steven Brotherton died by suicide and therefore came
under the custody of the Hamilton County, Ohio coroner, Dr. Frank
Cleveland.45 Ohio's presumed consent statute was typical-coroners
were allowed to retrieve corneas for transplantation as long as they
were unaware "of an[y] objection by the decedent, the decedent's
spouse, or, if there is no spouse, the next of kin, the guardian, or the
person authorized to dispose of the body."46 As it happened, Deborah
Brotherton had refused consent to the taking of her husband's
corneas, and her objection was documented in his medical record.47
However, the Hamilton County coroner's office had adopted a policy
"not to obtain a next of kin's consent or to inspect the medical records
765.5185 (2005) (permitting cornea removal if the medical examiner is unaware of an
objection).
41. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.9213 (West 2002) (authorizing removal of all
organs), repealed by Darlene Luther Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 2007 Minn.
Laws ch. 120, § 26 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 525A.01-25 (2008)), with N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH § 4222 (McKinney 2008) (authorizing removal of corneas and pituitary
glands).
42. Compare HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327-4 (LexisNexis 2007) (not requiring
autopsy), repealed by 2008 Haw. Sess. Laws ch. 122, § 54 (codified at HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 327-4 (2008)), with GA. CODE ANN. § 31-23-6(b) (2006) (requiring that an autopsy be
performed), repealed by 2008 Ga. Laws 545 § 3 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-140
to -159.4 (2008)).
43. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991).
44. Id. at 478.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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or hospital documents before removing corneas."48 Indeed, when
personnel at the local eye bank started asking about the existence of
objections to removals, Dr. Cleveland instructed his staff to withhold
information about next of kin. 49
In contrast to the state courts that rejected constitutional claims,
the Sixth Circuit recognized a Fourteenth Amendment procedural
due process right for family members. 50 The court hinted that actual
consent might be required before corneas could be taken, noting that
family members have (limited) property rights in a dead person's
body under state law and that prior United States Supreme Court
case law required a formal hearing before property rights could be
infringed under an official government policy like the one in
Brotherton.51 In the end, the court did not decide exactly what level
of process was due to Ms. Brotherton, holding only that some process
was due to her before the corneas could be taken.52 One could read
Brotherton in one of several ways: as requiring only that coroners
(and medical examiners) peruse the medical record to make sure they
find any documented objections, as requiring coroners to follow the
1987 UAGA and make reasonable efforts to speak to next of kin, or
as requiring that coroners actually obtain the next of kin's consent
(since a formal hearing would give next of kin the opportunity to
either consent or object).
The Ninth Circuit followed the lead of the Sixth Circuit when it
faced a similar case to Brotherton, Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran.53
Newman arose out of rather seamy practices at the Los Angeles
County coroner's office.54 According to an expos6 in the Los Angeles
Times, the L.A. coroner studiously avoided any efforts to speak with
family members about taking corneas from dead persons, so no
objections could be identified, and there was a strong profit motive
for the practice. The coroner's office sold the corneas to a for-profit
tissue bank, receiving about $250,000 a year. 55
The Newman court's opinion reads much like that of the
48. Id.
49. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 173 F.3d 552, 556 (6th Cir. 1999). The record does not
indicate that Dr. Cleveland was driven by a profit motive or other secondary gain. Id.
Also, a lawyer for the plaintiffs, Stephen A. Bailey, was not aware of any such motive.
Telephone Interview with Stephen A. Bailey, Founding Partner, Martin & Bailey
(June 4, 2008).
50. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 481-82.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002).
54. Ralph Frammolino, Harvest of Corneas at Morgue Questioned, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
2, 1997, at Al.
55. Id.
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Brotherton court. After reviewing the history of property rights in
cadavers, the court cited the Brotherton court's analysis and stated
its agreement that family members may claim property rights in the
body of a deceased person.56 The Newman court then concluded with
essentially the same Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process
analysis as did the Brotherton court. It cited the U.S. Supreme
Court's opinions in which the Court required a formal hearing before
property rights could be infringed by the state when the state acted
under official government policy, but declined to decide exactly what
process is due before corneas can be retrieved by coroners or other
public officials. 57
Although the Brotherton and Newman courts did not decide what
process is due before corneas can be taken from a cadaver for
transplantation, their suggestions of a hearing before retrieval raised
serious questions about the validity of the presumed consent
statutes. In 2006, the drafters of the 2006 UAGA eliminated the
provision for presumed consent, citing the Brotherton case and
observing that the change was made in light of "lawsuits in which
[the coroner's] [medical examiner's] actions were held to violate the
property rights of surviving family members."58 In 2007 and 2008,
56. Newman, 287 F.3d at 795-98.
57. Id. at 799-800.
58. REV. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFr ACT, Summary of the Changes in the Revised Act
(2006) (alterations in original). Professor Michelle Goodwin participated in the
discussions leading to the 2006 UAGA. She reports that she initiated the
reconsideration of the presumed consent provisions and encouraged their removal over
the objections of the representative for the tissue bank industry. Interview with
Michele B. Goodwin, Everett Fraser Professor of Law, University of Minnesota, in San
Diego, Cal. (Jan. 9, 2009).
Interestingly, representatives of the Eye Bank Association of America did not
oppose the elimination of presumed consent by the drafters of the 2006 UAGA. While
the Association would have preferred to retain presumed consent as an option for
obtaining corneas or other eye tissue, regulations of the FDA require tissue banks to
try to obtain a medical history of the decedent as part of the screening process for
tissue donation. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1270.21(h), 1271.50, 1271.75 (2008) (requiring donor
screening, including review of medical records, which in turn includes a medical
interview). Medical testing can pick up most infected tissues, but not all of them. Many
experts believe that medical and social histories are important for identifying potential
donors who have a high risk of carrying a communicable disease and are therefore not
qualified to be tissue donors. For example, a social history can help identify people who
have engaged in injection drug use and therefore are have an elevated risk of HIV
infection. The most likely providers of the medical and social history are family
members. But other experts observe that family members often can add little relevant
information beyond what is already included in the medical record. Although the FDA
regulations allow the tissue bank to obtain the history from the decedent's primary
treating physician, and the tissue bank is only required to try to obtain the medical
history, the regulations have eliminated presumed consent to cornea donation for the
most part. Eye banks generally will not use corneas unless they can obtain a medical
history from a family member-and once they reach a family member for the history,
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thirty-three states and the District of Columbia enacted the 2006
UAGA, with most of them eliminating presumed consent entirely and
only a few retaining it, primarily just for corneas. 59
In sum, within fifteen years of the Brotherton decision, a
consensus began to develop that presumed consent should be
abandoned. Indeed, in the same year as the issuance of the 2006
UAGA, an influential panel of the Institute of Medicine reviewed the
arguments for and against presumed consent and concluded that
states should keep explicit consent requirements for organ
donation.60 This chronology of events raises an important question-
why is presumed consent apparently being abandoned in the United
States?
III. REASONS FOR THE ABANDONMENT OF PRESUMED CONSENT TO
ORGAN DONATION IN THE UNITED STATES
The desire to abandon presumed consent is not obvious. Indeed,
the idea of presumed consent has much to commend it. When people
die, their hearts, lungs, livers, and kidneys are no longer useful to
them, but the organs can prolong the lives of other people, whose own
organs have failed. Why waste precious organs by burying them?61 If
presumed consent would increase the likelihood that a person's
organs would be transplanted to someone else after the person's
death, then social welfare would be greater. From a utilitarian
perspective, the adoption of presumed consent makes considerable
sense.62
One can adduce powerful deontological arguments as well for
presumed consent. There is much appeal to the position that people
do not "own" their bodies in the way that they own their homes, cars,
or clothing. In this view, bodies are not property to be sold or even
given away at the discretion of the individual. Rather, people hold
their organs in stewardship for God63 or for society, and when they
have gotten their full benefit from the organs, it is time to pass the
they then can ask for consent to donation. Telephone Interview with Patricia Aiken-
O'Neill, Executive Director, Eye Bank Association of America (May 2008).
59. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
60. COMM. ON INCREASING RATES OF ORGAN DONATION, supra note 7, at 227.
61. Dukeminier & Sanders, supra note 8, at 413.
62. To be sure, there are some drawbacks to presumed consent even for a
utilitarian. If an organ is taken from a person who would not have consented to
donation, then family members may suffer substantial psychological discomfort. In
addition, a rule of presumed consent might create dissatisfaction with the organ
transplant system and make people less willing to donate. More people might then
document their objection to being an organ donor.
63. E.g., ELLIOTT N. DORFF, MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH: A JEWISH APPROACH TO
MODERN MEDICAL ETHICS 15 (1998) (describing Jewish belief that bodies are owned by
God).
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organs onto other persons who can continue to benefit.
That said, presumed consent has not been successful in the
United States, and for several reasons:
A. Presumed Consent Did Not Address the Main Reason Why
People Do Not Become Organ Donors After Death
Importantly, presumed consent in the United States was
premised on faulty assumptions about organ donation decisions. The
presumed consent statutes were designed to create a default rule in
the law that more accurately reflected people's preferences and that
overcame obstacles to the vindication of those preferences.
Accordingly, for presumed consent laws to have increased the organ
supply, the following conditions needed to be true: (a) people
generally want to donate their organs, but (b) people's wishes to
donate are frustrated because they do not get around to documenting
their preferences while alive, and family members often are
unreachable to give consent in the short time period in which organs
must be removed for transplantation. The Florida Supreme Court's
opinion in State v. Powell illustrates this thinking:
An affidavit in the record reveals that, before legislation authorized
medical examiners in California to remove corneas without the
consent of the next of kin, the majority of the families asked by the
Los Angeles medical examiner's office responded positively;
however, approximately eighty percent of the families could not be
located in sufficient time for medical examiners to remove usable
corneal tissue from the decedents. 64
By replacing a requirement for explicit consent with a policy of
presumed consent, it was thought that transplant programs would be
more likely to obtain organs or tissues that they should be obtaining.
It turns out, however, that organ donation is not frustrated by
the inability of transplant personnel to contact family members.
Rather, a key reason why organs are not obtained after a person's
death is the unwillingness of family members to give consent. 65
Studies have shown that physicians generally are able to talk to
family members about donation, but family members often refuse to
permit donation.66 For example, in one careful, national study,
researchers found that a family member was unavailable to give
consent in less than 3% of cases, but that when family members were
asked, they did not give consent 46% of the time.67 Other researchers
64. State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 1986).
65. The failure of people to express their wishes about organ donation while still
alive is the other key reason why organs often are not donated after death.
66. Sheehy et al., supra note 7, at 671.
67. Id. (finding also that family members were not asked for consent in 16% of
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also have found a refusal rate of about 50% from families.68 Because
presumed consent as implemented in the United States allowed
families to object to donation, it did not address the problem of
refusal by family members.
To be sure, presumed consent can increase organ donation rates
somewhat even if family members are allowed to object.69 Families
may be influenced by the signaling effect of the law's default rule. 70 If
society presumes consent instead of presuming non-consent, it
suggests to family members that donation is the preferred choice.71
Some family members may respond to that suggestion by agreeing to
donate when they otherwise would have withheld consent. 72
Presumed consent can increase organ donation rates also by
changing the way organ procurement personnel phrase their
question to the family.73 Under an opt-in system, families might be
asked whether they know of any reason to think that the decedent
would choose to donate.74 In the absence of any knowledge of the
decedent's preferences, the family can easily withhold their consent
to organ retrieval.75 Under an opt-out system, on the other hand,
families might be asked whether they know of any reason to think
that the decedent would decline donation.76 The family that is
unaware of the decedent's preferences may be inclined to authorize
organ retrieval. 77
Data from countries that employ presumed consent suggest that
the shift from an opt-in to an opt-out system can increase organ
procurement by as much as 25-30%.78 However, presumed consent
with a family veto would probably have a smaller effect than that in
the United States. This is because the per capita rate for organ
cases).
68. See, e.g., Steven L. Gortmaker et al., Improving the Request Process to Increase
Family Consent for Organ Donation, 8 J. TRANSPLANT COORDINATION 210, 210 (1998)
(describing studies in which family refusal rates were 52% and 54%, respectively).
69. Kieran Healy, Do Presumed-Consent Laws Raise Organ Procurement Rates?,
55 DEPAuL L. REV. 1017, 1028-29 (2006).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 1028.
74. See id.
75. See COMM. ON INCREASING RATES OF ORGAN DONATION, supra note 7, at 212.
76. See Healy, supra note 69, at 1028.
77. Id.; see also Ori Scott & Eyal Jacobson, Implementing Presumed Consent for
Organ Donation in Israel: Public, Religious and Ethical Issues, 9 ISRAELI MED. ASS'N
J. 777, 778 (2007).
78. Alberto Abadie & Sebastien Gay, The Impact of Presumed Consent Legislation
on Cadaveric Organ Donation: A Cross-Country Study, 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 599, 610
(2006).
[Vol. 61:2
2009] PRESUMED CONSENT TO ORGAN DONATION 311
donation is already higher in the United States than in many
countries with presumed consent.7 9 In addition, in countries with a
presumed consent policy, a family veto reduces the impact of the
policy.80 Still, while presumed consent would not reach most of the
organs that are not donated by decedents' families, it could have a
meaningful impact.81
Could presumed consent be implemented in a way that fully
addresses the refusals of family members? Organ transplant
personnel might identify the reasons for family refusals and develop
approaches to family members that would be more likely to elicit
their consent. But such approaches could be implemented under a
policy of explicit consent, and therefore presumed consent is
unnecessary for their success. Alternatively, the United States could
adopt a policy of presumed consent without giving families the option
of withholding consent. Under this stronger form of presumed
consent, consent to organ donation would be assumed unless the
decedent objected to donation.
There is good reason to deny family members the option to
withhold consent to organ retrieval. Although the law gives decision-
making authority to the family to carry out the decedent's wishes,
family members often do not accurately reflect a dead person's
preferences.82 A person may have wanted to donate organs after
death, but family members might refuse consent nevertheless.
Indeed, many family members substitute their own preferences for
those of the decedent.83 For example, while family members
generally indicate that they base their refusals on the wishes of the
decedent,S4 they also often give reasons for their refusals that seem
79. COMM. ON INCREASING RATES OF ORGAN DONATION, supra note 7, at 213.
80. Kai-Lung Hui & Ivan P.L. Png, Presumed Consent and Cadaveric Organ
Donation: Cross-Country Evidence (National Univ. of Singapore, Working Paper
Series), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1307386.
81. If half of usable organs are retrieved from decedents currently, see supra text
accompanying note 7, organ procurement personnel would need to increase organ
retrieval rates by 100% to maximize the organ supply. Presumed consent, then, might
address as much as 25-30% of the lost opportunity.
82. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
83. As case law recognizes, family members have their own rights at stake with
respect to a decedent's body. Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 796-97 (9th
Cir. 2002); Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991). Nevertheless,
individuals' rights to determine the disposition of their own organs after death trump
the rights of family members to decide on the disposition of decedents' organs. REV.
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 8(a) (2006).
84. When family members explain their reasons for refusing consent, fidelity to the
decedent's wishes is the most common reason given. Laura Siminoff et al., The
Reasons Families Donate Organs for Transplantation: Implications for Policy and
Practice, 62 J. TRAUMA INJURY INFECTION & CRITICAL CARE 969, 973 (2007) (reporting
that 51% of families stated that their refusal reflected their understanding of the
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to reflect their own interests. Many family members report that they
"had been through enough and therefore could not tolerate the organ
donation process," or that they "were concerned that donation would
disfigure the body and/or preclude an open-casket funeral."85
More importantly, families frequently block organ donation even
when a person filled out an organ donor card while alive-and the
override rate can be quite high.86 In Indiana in 2000, family members
overrode a decedent's choice to donate in 74 out of 184 cases
involving eligible donors who had indicated their wishes on their
drivers' licenses.87 That 40% override rate led the legislature to
modify the state's uniform anatomical gift act to make it clear that
the decedent's wishes take priority over those of family members.88
While presumed consent in the United States did not deal with
the possibility of families substituting their own preferences for those
of the decedent, one could prevent inappropriate family decisions by
implementing the stronger form of presumed consent that allows
objections only from the decedent while alive.89
This policy option raises two questions: Do people generally want
their organs taken after their deaths? If so, would it work to
implement a presumed consent system that denies family members
any opportunity to object to donation (that is, a stronger version of
presumed consent)? As discussed below, one can mount a good,
though not decisive, argument that people generally want to be organ
decedent's wishes).
85. Id.
86. Jennifer Wagner, Organ Donors Get Final Say Under Law, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, May 7, 2001, at lA.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also Dave Wendler & Neal Dickert, The Consent Process for Cadaveric
Organ Procurement: How Does It Work? How Can It Be Improved?, 285 JAMA 329, 329
(2001) (finding that organ procurement organizations are as likely to follow the
family's wishes as to follow the decedent's wishes). Other studies have found lower
rates of family override. See, e.g., J.R. Rodrigue et al., Organ Donation Decision:
Comparison of Donor and Nondonor Families, 6 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 190, 196
(2006) (finding 16.1% override rate in a study of organ donation decisions in a
southeastern state).
In response to this problem, states have passed provisions explicitly prohibiting
families from overriding a decedent's expressed desire for posthumous donation. IND.
CODE ANN. §29-2-16.1-7(a) (LexisNexis 2008) (original version at IND. CODE ANN. § 29-
2-16-2.5 (West 2001)); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.78 (LexisNexis 2007). The 2006
UAGA recommends a provision to preclude family overrides. REV. UNIF. ANATOMICAL
GIFT ACT § 8(a) (2006).
89. Another alternative would be to allow family decision making only when it is
clear that the family is acting in accordance with the decedent's wishes. However, it
would be difficult to distinguish between faithful and unfaithful families. And if there
were clear evidence about the decedent's wishes, it would not be necessary to give
decision-making authority to the family. Physicians could simply implement the
decedent's clear wishes.
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donors after death and that presumed consent would vindicate
patient autonomy. As to bypassing families, however, the experience
in the United States with presumed consent indicates that it has not
worked to take organs without family consultation. Excluding
families from participation has too greatly reinforced concerns that
the organ transplant system would abuse its presumed consent
authority.
B. A Stronger Version of Presumed Consent Probably Would Not
Work
Consideration of a version of presumed consent that excludes
family involvement raises important questions about individual
autonomy. If families could not object to organ donation on behalf of
the decedent, many more organs would be removed from dead
persons. But some of those organs would be taken from decedents
who did not want their organs taken but failed to express their
objections before their deaths. This has led critics of presumed
consent to object on grounds that it would violate principles of
autonomy.9o Our society recognizes the right of persons to accept or
reject invasions of their bodies, and that right includes the power to
decide whether or not to donate organs. Under a strong presumed
consent system, many people would have their organs taken even
though they would not have wanted them taken.
It turns out that the argument from autonomy is more
complicated than suggested by some critics of presumed consent. A
requirement for actual consent can violate autonomy just as easily as
can a policy of presumed consent. 91 Under the current policy of actual
consent, many people do not become organ donors after death, even
though that would be their choice, because they did not express their
wishes to donate organs while alive, or because family members
override their wishes after their deaths.92
If autonomy might be violated with either actual consent or
presumed consent, how do we balance the two risks of error? Should
we be more worried about the loss of autonomy under presumed
consent or the loss of autonomy under actual consent?
90. Charles A. Erin & John Harris, Presumed Consent or Contracting Out, 25 J.
MED. ETHICS 365, 365 (1999).
91. See Marie-Andr~e Jacob, Another Look at the Presumed-Versus-Informed
Consent Dichotomy in Postmortem Organ Procurement, 20 BIOETHICS 293, 294 (2006).
92. Although the 2006 UAGA and many states' laws deny family members the
authority to override the decedent's wishes, see supra note 68, transplant surgeons
may be reluctant to retrieve organs in the face of familial opposition. Moreover, many
people might express their willingness to donate to family members without
documenting their wishes with organ donor cards or on their driver's licenses, so
doctors would not know that the family is overriding the decedent's wishes.
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1. Presumed Consent Might Better Protect Patient
Autonomy Than Does Actual Consent
Public views can help us decide whether presumed or actual
consent better serves the interests of patient autonomy. How, then,
do people feel about presumed consent versus actual consent to organ
donation? Polling data sends a mixed message. In a 2005 national
survey, 85.9% of the public thought that presumed consent would
increase the organ supply, but only 43.2% supported a system of
presumed consent.93 On the other hand, only 31.3% said they would
opt out of a presumed consent system.94
There may be better ways to measure people's actual
preferences. As James Muyskens has argued, we should consider the
question of consent to posthumous organ donation as a question of
"health insurance" and ask what a rational person would be willing
to "pay" in order to have the health care needed in the event of organ
failure.95 From that perspective, he observes, people generally would
be willing to relinquish their right to be buried intact in order to have
a decent chance of receiving an organ transplant at a time of need.96
Very likely, people would choose the greater opportunity to live
longer over the greater opportunity to retain organs after death. 97
One could come to the same conclusion by asking which policy
will have the smaller risk of error. Under current policies of actual
consent, how many people do not become organ donors despite their
desire to donate (erroneous non-donations)? On the other hand, if
policies of presumed consent were adopted, how many people would
become organ donors despite their opposition to donating (erroneous
donations)? We could choose the policy that maximizes the number of
people whose wishes are fulfilled.
Under this approach, it appears that presumed consent is the
better policy.9 Public opinion surveys consistently find that a
majority of people say they want to have their organs used for
93. THE GALLUP ORG., NATIONAL SURVEY OF ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION
ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS 21 (2005), ftp://ftp.hrsa.gov/organdonor/survey2005.pdf.
94. Id. In a survey of persons who had been asked about donating a deceased
family member's organs, only about one-fourth agreed or strongly agreed that
presumed consent should be adopted. James R. Rodrigue et al., Attitudes Toward
Financial Incentives, Donor Authorization, and Presumed Consent Among Next-of-Kin
Who Consented vs. Refused Organ Donation, 81 TRANSPLANTATION 1249, 1253 tbl.4
(2006).
95. Muyskens, supra note 8, at 97.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 97-98.
98. See Carl Cohen, The Case for Presumed Consent to Transplant Human Organs
After Death, 24 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 2168, 2169 (1992); Gill, supra note 8,
at 44-51.
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transplantation after death.99 More than 70% of the public states
that they are somewhat or very likely to donate,100 and about 53.2%
of people have documented their willingness to donate.0 It makes
sense to base the law's "default" rule according to the majority's
preference. That is, if 70% of people want to donate organs and only
30% do not want to donate, the law should assume that people want
to donate, thereby satisfying 70% rather than 30% of the population.
Of course, it is more complicated than that. People can opt out of
default rules. Under our current system, we assume people do not
want to donate organs after death, but they or their families can
overcome this presumption by giving consent to donation (and many
in fact do so). Conversely, in a strong presumed consent system, we
would assume that people want to donate their organs after death,
but they could overcome such a presumption by expressing their
opposition to donation. And so we have to ask different questions:
Under a policy of actual consent, how many people fail to express
their wishes and therefore lose the opportunity to become organ
donors? Under a policy of presumed consent, how many people would
fail to express their wishes and therefore become unwilling organ
donors?
Even with these questions, presumed consent would seem to
result in fewer errors than does a requirement of actual consent.
After all, in a presumed consent system, no more than 30% of the
public would become unwilling donors by failing to lodge their
objections to donation (since less than 30% of the public classifies
itself as "not very/not at all likely" to donate).102 In contrast, under
the current system, more than 70% of the public could fail to express
their desire for donation and lose their opportunity to become
donors.103 Or, someone while alive might express willingness to
donate organs after death, but family members might withhold
consent to donation. At the time of a loved one's death, when grief is
overwhelming, people may be offended by a request for organ
donation, or they may feel that granting permission for donation
would violate or demean the dead person. 104
Moreover, we might expect those who oppose donation to be more
99. THE GALLUP ORG., supra note 93, at 6.
100. See id. (finding that 78.2% of the public is very likely or somewhat likely to
donate organs after death).
101. See id. at 10.
102. See id. at 6.
103. See id. (applying the same rationale that the 78.2% of those polled by Gallup
classify themselves as "very likely" or "somewhat likely" to donate).
104. Muyskens, supra note 8, at 96. The likelihood that a family member would
override a decedent's wishes to donate may be as high as 40%. See Wagner, supra note
86, at IA.
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scrupulous than those who desire donation about expressing their
wishes. Opposition to donation likely will reflect a deeply held moral
view, and just as Jehovah's Witnesses are careful to express their
opposition to blood transfusions, so might people objecting to organ
donation be careful to express their views under a presumed consent
system.105 And as Linda Fentiman suggests, it would be possible to
provide ample opportunity for people to document their objection to
organ donation.106 She proposes a national, electronic registry and a
system in which people could register their objections "when
obtaining or renewing a driver's license; on filing an income tax
return; when applying for welfare[,] disability or other governmental
benefits; [and] on every visit to a hospital or doctor's office . . . ... 107
In short, it may well be the case that a regime of strong
presumed consent would more likely ensure that society carries out a
person's wishes about organ donation after death.
2. Actual Consent Might Better Protect Autonomy Than
Would Presumed Consent
There also is evidence supporting the view that there are fewer
erroneous non-donations under a policy of actual consent than there
would be erroneous donations under a policy of presumed consent.
The argument for presumed consent rests in large part on the survey
data showing a strong majority of people who say they would want
their organs taken after death. 108 But while a large majority of the
public reports a preference for organ retrieval, barely more than half
of the public actually document a desire to be an organ donor after
death. 109 How then do we interpret this discrepancy? Is it that the
great majority of persons do want to donate, but many simply fail to
take the necessary steps to document their preferences? Or is it that
almost half of persons really do not want to be organ donors, but
105. Gill, supra note 8, at 41. Opponents of presumed consent observe that people
typically are unaware of the law regarding organ donation, and under a presumed
consent system, many people will fail to lodge their objection to donation out of
ignorance of the law. However, the same problem exists with a policy of actual consent.
Many people who want to donate their organs fail to express their wishes currently.
Id. at 41-42.
106. Linda C. Fentiman, Organ Donation as National Service: A Proposed Federal
Organ Donation Law, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1593, 1600 (1994).
107. Id. (proposing also that objections could be documented when the person is
asked to consider organ donation or when executing a living will or other advance
directive). It would be critical to include something like the Fentiman proposal if
presumed consent were to be adopted, along with assurances that people would be
made aware of the option to express their objections to organ donation when the
opportunities for opting out arise.
108. See supra Part III.B.1.
109. THE GALLUP ORG., supra note 93, at 10.
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many of them give the socially preferred response in public opinion
surveys? If barely half of the public actually wants to be an organ
donor, then a policy of presumed consent could easily lead to more
erroneous donations than the number of erroneous non-donations
that occur under our policy of actual consent.
The possibility that people really do not want to be organ donors
is particularly important with minorities. Public opinion surveys find
less support among the poor and minorities than among the well-to-
do or whites.11o While 60.5% of whites have granted permission for
organ donation on their drivers' licenses, only 39.3% of Latinos, and
31.2% of blacks have done so.", Vulnerable populations are not only
less likely to support organ donation; they also would be less likely to
realize that presumed consent statutes exist and that they would
need to lodge their objections to organ donation. Without a reliable
method of opting out of presumed consent, presumed consent could
easily operate to the particular disadvantage of vulnerable
populations. Indeed, Marie-Andr~e Jacob has argued that the
possibility of unfairness to vulnerable populations should push us
toward actual consent.112 Analogizing to contract law, which places
on the more powerful party the burden of contracting out of default
rules, she suggests that default rules for posthumous organ donation
place the burden on doctors to overcome the rules.113 In other words,
the burden should remain on physicians to obtain consent to organ
donation rather than placing the burden on individuals to express
their objection to donation.114
There are other considerations to take into account. While one
policy may reflect the preferences of the majority, the minority may
have more at stake in the decision whether to take organs without
actual consent. In other words, the harm from an erroneous donation
under presumed consent may be greater than the harm from an
erroneous non-donation under actual consent. And often in balancing
risks of error, we compare not only the number of people that might
be wronged, but also the magnitudes of the risks of error. For
example, the criminal law requires prosecutors to prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt115 because of the view that it is much worse to
110. Seeid. at 6.
111. Id. at 11; see also Laura A. Siminoff et al., Racial Disparities in Preferences and
Perceptions Regarding Organ Donation, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 995, 997 (2006)
(finding in a survey of Ohioans that 64.9% of whites but only 39.1% of blacks had
signed an organ donor card or other document).
112. Jacob, supra note 91, at 299-300.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. WAYNER. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.8(g) (4th ed. 2003).
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convict an innocent person than to acquit a guilty person116 (or better
to let ten guilty people go free than imprison one innocent person).
Similarly, on the question of withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment from persons who no longer can speak for themselves,
many states require the provision of treatment unless there is clear
and convincing evidence that the patient would not want the
treatment.117 As with criminal prosecutions, the states erect a high
procedural threshold when it comes to the withdrawal of care from
an incapacitated person. These states could ask simply whether it is
more likely than not that a person would refuse life-sustaining
treatment, but they instead weight their policies in favor of providing
the treatment. Even though such policies mean that many people
receive undesired treatment, it reduces the possibility that someone
will be denied desired treatment. For these states, it is better that
several people be kept alive too long than one person die too soon.
How does this approach play out with presumed consent to organ
donation? Is it worse to take organs when the patient would not have
wanted them taken, or is it worse to leave organs when the patient
would have wanted them taken? At first glance, there is no harm or
benefit either way.lls Taking or leaving organs has no effect on the
welfare of a dead person. However, we believe it matters whether we
respect the previously expressed wishes of a dead person because of
the importance of such respect for people when they are still alive.119
That is, people want to know that they will be treated after their
death as they wish to be treated. Thus, for example, we assure people
that they can direct the disposition of their property after they die by
writing a will, and we assure people they can direct the disposition of
their bodies after they die by expressing a preference for burial or
cremation. 120
There are two important reasons why we might view the harm
from an erroneous donation under presumed consent as worse than
an erroneous non-donation under actual consent. First, religious
116. Id. § 1.4.
117. See ORENTLICHER ET AL., supra note 5, at 285-86. Other states allow the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment when family members request withdrawal, or
when it is in the best interests of the patient to forgo further treatment. Id. at 286-89.
118. Veronica English & Ann Sommerville, Presumed Consent for Transplantation:
A Dead Issue After Alder Hey?, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 147, 150 (2003).
119. Gill, supra note 8, at 44-45.
120. Id. at 46. To be sure, we can explain in a number of ways society's recognition
of the previously expressed wishes of dead persons. We may do so to avoid
psychological injury to the person's surviving family, we may do so to ensure that
people are not anxious about what happens to their families or themselves after death,
and we may do so to promote socially-desirable behavior. As to the last point, society
promotes wealth-creating behavior by allowing people to write wills that leave their
accumulated wealth to their children or other people or causes.
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beliefs may be more important in decisions not to donate than in
decisions to donate.121 Some people may have strong religious
objections to being an organ donor, but other people may not have a
strong religious desire to be an organ donor. On the other hand, the
religious argument may not be insurmountable. While it is commonly
believed that orthodox religious doctrine rejects organ donation, this
is not actually the case.122 Indeed, organ donation is permitted by
many mainstream religious denominations. 123 Orthodox Judaism, for
example, permits organ retrieval after death, as long as physicians
can demonstrate that a specific person stands to lose his or her life or
an entire physical ability (e.g., the ability to see) without the
donation.124 At the same time, religious doctrine may even impose a
duty to donate one's organs.125 In short, it does not appear that
religious considerations should doom presumed consent, but other
considerations might.
In particular, it may be the case that people who object to organ
donation feel more strongly about their objection, even if not
religiously based, than people who desire organ donation feel about
their wishes. 126 Under the current system, potential organ donors
know that their desire to be an organ donor after death may be
unfulfilled. In a presumed consent system, non-donors would know
that their objections to organ donation might not be respected. It is
very possible that the anxiety from the possibility of unwanted organ
donation would be more serious than the anxiety from losing the
chance to be an organ donor. People tend to worry more about losing
something they have already, and wish to keep, than about not
getting something they want. 127
Indeed, there is good reason to think that the distress to the
living from the possibility that their organs might be taken after
death is more substantial than the distress from the possibility that
organs might not be taken. While there are a number of lawsuits
brought by family members when a dead person's organs or tissues
have been removed without consent,128 there are not comparable
121. English & Sommerville, supra note 118, at 149.
122. Maxwell J. Mehlman, Presumed Consent to Organ Donation: A Reevaluation, 1
HEALTH MATRIX 31, 50-53 (1991).
123. Id.
124. DORFF, supra note 63, at 226-27.
125. Id. at 227-28.
126. See Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, 16(5) HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28,
30 (1986).
127. Eric J. Johnson & Daniel G. Goldstein, Defaults and Donation Decisions, 78
TRANSPLANTATION 1713, 1714 (2004).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37, 43-55; see also Jacobsen v. Marin
Gen. Hosp., 192 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 1999) (involving a lawsuit by parents after a man's
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lawsuits brought by family members when organs have not been
removed despite the decedent's or family's wishes for donation.
In sum, one can adduce good arguments from considerations of
autonomy to both justify and reject a strong version of presumed
consent that excludes family involvement. But even if one concludes
that family involvement in the donation decision tends to result in
family members overriding individual preferences in favor of
donation, the option of excluding families from the donation decision
has not proved feasible in the United States. Indeed, as discussed
above, when coroners tried to exclude families from cornea donation
decisions, they only provoked a backlash that led to the abandonment
of presumed consent by the drafters of the 2006 UAGA.129 Why this
happened is the topic for the next section of this Article.
3. Physician Authority to Take Organs Without Consent or
Family Involvement Increased Public Concern About
the Integrity of the Organ Transplant System
Organ transplantation policy is regularly influenced by the need
to maintain public trust in the system of organ procurement and
allocation. Given the serious shortage of organs, people worry that
transplant personnel will act wrongly in procuring organs or in
allocating them.
Employing presumed consent and also excluding families from
the donation decision may increase public concerns about the
transplant system. Indeed, for centuries, people have worried that
the pursuit of medical and scientific interests will lead doctors to
engage in misconduct when it comes to securing body parts, and for
centuries, there have been dishonest physicians who validated those
concerns.
There are two aspects to the concern about unscrupulous
behavior by doctors or others. First, coroners or physicians may take
organs and other body parts after death against the known wishes of
the dead person (or of the decedent's family members). In other
words, erroneous donations may occur, not only because mistakes
will be made, but also because of intentional misconduct. Second, and
more worrisome, coroners or doctors may not wait until death to take
the organs-the great need for organs may result in practices that
shorten patients' lives. Indeed, even under our current system of
actual consent, people worry that doctors may declare death
organs were removed by a coroner). Although a family's lawsuit may reflect its own
distress, the point still stands. Families appear to be more distressed when organs are
taken without consent than when organs are not taken despite consent.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
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prematurely to free up organs for transplantation. 130 Or they worry
that doctors may not treat diseases aggressively enough in order to
hasten the availability of organs for transplantation. 131 In one study
of families' reasons for refusing to donate the organs of deceased
persons, 25% of families cited mistrust of the health care system as a
basis for their refusal. 132
Transplant professionals place a high priority on reassuring the
public and building trust in the organ transplant system. Indeed, in
the wake of two recent organ donation controversies, experts
emphasized concerns about maintaining public trust. In July 2007,
prosecutors filed felony charges against a transplant surgeon in
California, alleging that he hastened the death of a patient whose
family had agreed to donation. 133 In discussing the charges, an organ
donation advocate observed that "'we spend an inordinate amount of
time telling people [that these kinds of abuses] won't happen."' 134 In a
second controversy in August 2008, transplant surgeons in Colorado
provoked a major debate after reporting a practice of retrieving
hearts from infants who were declared dead because their hearts had
stopped beating for seventy-five seconds.135 The organs were then
transplanted into other infants and the heartbeats restored.136
Critics observed that the first infants were not actually dead when
their hearts were removed because the cessation of their heartbeats
was not irreversible, 137 and one leading expert predicted that the
transplant community would reject the seventy-five-second
130. Siminoff et al., supra note 111, at 997-98 (finding that 17% of whites and 32%
of blacks in Ohio felt that doctors cannot be trusted to pronounce death correctly when
a person is eligible to donate organs); see also Gina Kolata, Controversy Erupts Over
Organ Removals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1997, at A28.
131. Siminoff et al., supra note 111, at 998 (finding that 26% of whites and 39% of
blacks in Ohio said that if doctors know they are organ donors, the doctors would not
try to save their lives); see also English & Sommerville, supra note 118, at 149.
132. Siminoff et al., supra note 84, at 972 tbl.2.
133. Charles Ornstein & Tracy Weber, Doctor Charged in Death of Donor, L.A.
TIMES, July 31, 2007, at Al. A jury acquitted the surgeon after his trial. See Jesse
McKinley, Surgeon Cleared of Harming Man to Rush Organ Removal, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2008, at A30.
134. Jesse McKinley, Surgeon Accused of Speeding a Death to Get Organs, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2008, at Al (quoting David Fleming, Executive Director, Donate Life
America).
135. See David Armstrong, New Technique to Transplant Hearts in Babies, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 14, 2008, at Dl; see also Mark M. Boucek et al., Pediatric Heart
Transplantation After Declaration of Cardiocirculatory Death, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED.
709 (2008).
136. Boucek et al., supra note 135, at 709-10.
137. Robert M. Veatch, Donating Hearts After Cardiac Death-Reversing the
Irreversible, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 672, 673 (2008).
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standard. 138 Dr. James Bernat stated that "'there is a primal fear
people have of being declared dead wrongly."'139 He went on to say
that "'physicians and transplant enterprises need to be mindful to
reassure skeptical people that there will be no instance in which
surgeons will procure organs from someone before they are dead."'140
Academic debates over specific organ procurement or allocation
policies make the.same point-the impact of those policies on public
trust plays a critical role in assessing their acceptability. 141
Under a system of presumed consent that excludes a role for
families, the risk that doctors or other professionals will cut corners
to obtain organs for transplantation may be much greater than it is
under a system of actual.consent. With actual consent, there is'
greater oversight of the organ transplant system-family members
have to be much more involved in the process of organ retrieval with
actual consent since they are the primary givers of consent to
posthumous organ donation. If transplant professionals were able to
proceed with organ retrieval without speaking to family members,
there would be less of an opportunity for family members to
recognize unethical behavior.
Excluding family participation in the organ donation decision
may or may not promote unscrupulous practices by transplant
professionals. Such a policy would result in more organs becoming
available for transplantation, relieving a good deal of the organ
shortage. With an increase in available organs, coroners, physicians,
and others should feel less pressure to secure organs and therefore be
more willing to meet their ethical and legal obligations.
The historical evidence provides support for both possibilities.
Grave robbing for medical study and research in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries largely disappeared when legal reform
generated a sufficient supply of cadavers for dissection.142 On the
138. James L. Bernat, The Boundaries of Organ Donation After Circulatory Death,
359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 669, 670-71 (2008).
139. Armstrong, supra note 135 (quoting Dr. James Bernat).
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., James M. DuBois, Non-Heart-Beating Organ Donation: A Defense of
the Required Determination of Death, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 126, 132 (1999)
(observing that allowing organ procurement from dying patients before death could
undermine trust in the medical community); Alvin H. Moss & Mark Siegler, Should
Alcoholics Compete Equally for Liver Transplantation?, 265 JAMA 1295, 1297 (1991)
(arguing for lower priority for alcoholics in receiving liver transplants to protect public
support for the organ transplant system); Robert D. Truog, Brain Death-Too Flawed
to Endure, Too Ingrained to Abandon, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 273, 277 (2007)
(discussing the debate over implementation of brain death protocols for organ
removal).
142. Aaron D. Tward & Hugh A. Patterson, From Grave Robbing to Gifting.,
Cadaver Supply in the United States, 287 JAMA 1183, 1183 (2002).
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other hand, there are prominent recent examples of coroners abusing
their presumed consent authority when their practices were not
adequately monitored. As mentioned above and discussed further
below, the recent examples of misconduct under presumed consent
played a critical role in leading the drafters of the 2006 UAGA to
abandon presumed consent. 143
a. Reducing the Risk of Misconduct by Relieving the
Shortage of Organs
The possibility that presumed consent would reduce the risk of
professional misconduct by alleviating the organ shortage is
suggested by the Anglo-American experience with grave robbing.144
In the late 1700s and early 1800s, grave robbing and even murder
were serious problems in America and Great Britain, as criminals
found a ready market for dead bodies in medical schools that were
teaching or conducting research in human anatomy. 145 It was during
this period that Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley published
Frankenstein, 146 which told the story of a scientist, Victor
Frankenstein, who created his "monster" out of body parts secured
from various morgues and cemeteries. The notorious Burke and Hare
homicides in Scotland in the 1820s ultimately brought an end to
grave robbing for dead bodies in the United Kingdom and in some of
the United States by prompting the passage of legislation permitting
the dissection of unclaimed corpses. 147 It took several more decades
and other notorious cases before all of the United States passed
similar legislation. In 1878, for example, the robbing of U.S. Senator
John Scott Harrison's148 body from his grave led to anatomy laws in
Ohio and Indiana. By the beginning of the twentieth century,
unclaimed corpses became the general source of bodies for dissection
in the United States. 149
In short, once medical schools had a reliable supply of cadavers
for their teaching and research, doctors no longer looked to the black
market for cadavers, and the grave robbing came to an end. If
143. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
144. See Tward & Patterson, supra note 142, at 1183.
145. Id.
146. MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN, OR, THE MODERN
PROMETHEUS: THE 1818 TEXT (James Rieger ed., University of Chicago Press 1982)
(1818); cf. RUTH RICHARDSON, DEATH, DISSECTION AND THE DESTITUTE xiii (2d ed.
2000) ("[Blodysnatching was rife throughout Mary Shelley's childhood and early adult
life.").
147. Tward & Patterson, supra note 142, at 1183.
148. Id. Senator Harrison was the son of President William Henry Harrison and the
father of President Benjamin Harrison. Id.
149. Id.
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presumed consent greatly increased the supply of organs, then might
we also see a diminution in the degree of professional misconduct
with respect to organ procurement?
If such a diminution occurred, it would be very important.
Unfortunately, the serious shortage of organs has engendered a
significant risk of misconduct. Contemporary examples of abuse are
not difficult to find. Indeed, in the past few years alone, news media
have highlighted a number of problems, including:
* claims that a physician-led, criminal ring in India forcibly took
hundreds of kidneys from poor laborers for transplantation, 150
* the removal of bone from British broadcaster Alistair Cooke's
body and the taking of body parts from other persons without consent
for sale to tissue processing companies, 151 and
* criminal charges against a transplant surgeon in California
accused of hastening the death of a dying patient so his organs could
be removed for transplantation. 152
While there is reason to think that a strong version of presumed
consent could have a salutary effect on physician conduct, the U.S.
experience with presumed consent has in fact reinforced concerns
that it would encourage additional misconduct. As discussed in the
next section, the possibility that presumed consent would make
organ removal practices prone to an even greater risk of abuse than
exists currently under actual consent seems to have been realized.
b. Abuse by Professionals of Their Presumed Consent
Authority
For those who worry that transplant professionals will abuse
their presumed consent authority, they need look no further than the
litigation over presumed consent statutes in the United States.
Recall the Brotherton case in which an Ohio coroner went out of his
way to avoid discovering objections to cornea retrieval from
decedents.153 That case ultimately led to a settlement in which
$5,250,000 was paid to compensate the families harmed by the
150. Amelia Gentleman, Kidney Theft Ring Preys on India's Poorest Laborers, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2008, at A3.
151. Michael Brick, Alistair Cooke's Bones Were Plundered, His Daughter Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, at B4. Ultimately, participants in the profiteering racket were
convicted for taking Cooke's bones and the tissues of other dead persons without
consent. Scott Shifrel, Victim Lashes Out as Ghoul Gets 18-54 Years, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Jun. 28, 2008, at 22.
152. McKinley, supra note 134. The California medical licensing board also
launched a disciplinary action against the surgeon. Rong-Gong Li II, Board Targets
Doctor's License, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 6, 2008, at B3.
153. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 141 F. Supp. 2d 894, 898 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
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coroner's policy. 154 Similarly, in Newman, the coroner also took extra
steps not to discover objections to donations, 155 profiting to the tune
of $250,000 a year. 156 That case was ultimately settled under an
agreement of confidentiality, 157 and the California legislature
responded to the public outrage by repealing its presumed consent
statute.1ss These cases provided validation to people who were
concerned that doctors159 would abuse their authority when they
could act without the need for consent; the cases ultimately led the
drafters of the 2006 UAGA to drop their support for presumed
consent and most states to abandon presumed consent. 160
The public response to the coroners' actions in Brotherton and
Newman may have reflected not only concerns about coroners
ignoring the interests of dead persons and their families; there also
appears to have been real concern with the evidence suggesting that
presumed consent was implemented in a discriminatory fashion.
c. Discriminatory Implementation of Presumed
Consent
Nearly twenty years ago, in a provocative article about
mandatory organ donation, Guido Calabresi observed that legal
obligations for people to be organ donors might not be
unconstitutional, as long as the laws were applied evenhandedly.161
As he implied, it might not be any worse for the state to take hearts,
livers, or kidneys after a person's death for transplantation than to
tax a person's income to fund social services.162 But even if legal
mandates to donate organs might be constitutionally acceptable, they
would have to apply to all persons, regardless of their race, sex,
religion, etc. If we are going to impose duties to come to the aid of
others, Calabresi argued, we must be careful not to impose those
duties only on minorities who cannot protect themselves from the
majority.163 If the duties are imposed in a discriminatory way, then
they should be struck down by the courts. 164
How do considerations of fairness apply to presumed consent in
154. Id. at 901.
155. Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 2002).
156. Frammolino, supra note 54.
157. Telephone Interview with Cheryl Orr, Attorney for the Coroner (June 4, 2008).
158. 1998 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 887 (West). Interestingly, the legislature only
repealed presumed consent for corneas, retaining presumed consent for organs. Id.
159. In both cases, the coroners were physicians.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
161. Guido Calabresi, Do We Own Our Bodies?, 1 HEALTH MATRIX 5, 13 (1991).
162. Id. at 18.
163. Id. at 11-14.
164. Id. at 13-14.
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the United States? Recall that the presumed consent statutes
authorized presumed consent only for persons under the custody of
coroners or medical examiners. At first glance, this seems like a
reasonable restriction. For those cadavers, coroners and medical
examiners already will be performing autopsies. Inasmuch as an
autopsy entails a major invasion of the cadaver, taking organs for
transplantation seems less offensive than it might otherwise be. In
this regard, it is important that states have been more likely to
permit retrieval of corneas with presumed consent than to permit
retrieval of hearts, livers, and other organs. Corneas are a thin,
transparent layer of tissue whose presence or absence cannot be
detected by the naked eye. The intrusion from taking a cornea does
not compare to the intrusion of an autopsy. 165
Moreover, while people under the custody of coroners or medical
examiners are not representative of the general population, they may
be representative of the population of potential organ donors. Data
indicate that over half and perhaps two-thirds of potential organ
donors are under the custody of coroners or medical examiners, 166 So
restricting organ retrieval to such persons may not disfavor
minorities.
On closer consideration, concerns about fairness are very serious.
While the state statutes cover any person who comes under the
custody of a coroner or medical examiner, the population of such
persons may be disproportionately poor and minority, at least in
major urban centers.16 7 Moreover, disparities may exist when
coroners or medical examiners decide whether to retrieve organs or
tissues from a dead person under their custody. When the Los
Angeles Times exposed the cornea retrieval practices of the county
coroner, the newspaper found that that over 80% of the corneas came
from blacks or Latinos even though only 44% of autopsies involved
blacks or Latinos. 168 Given the overrepresentation of minorities and
poor persons, one has to wonder whether the presumed consent
statutes would ever have been passed if they applied equally to
165. State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 1986).
166. J. Keith Pinckard et al., National Association of Medical Examiners' Position
Paper on the Medical Examiner Release of Organs and Tissues for Transplantation, 28
AM. J. FORENSIC MED. PATHOLOGY 202, 205 (2007) (stating that 62.1% of potential
donors are under custody of medical examiners and/or coroners); Teresa J. Shafer et
al., Vital Role of Medical Examiners and Coroners in Organ Transplantation, 4 AM. J.
TRANSPLANTATION 160, 162 (2004) (indicating that 56% of donors were under custody
of medical examiners and/or coroners). Over time, the jurisdiction of coroners and
medical examiners has expanded considerably; it now includes persons who die when
unattended by a physician. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 406.1(1)(a)(5) (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 130A-383(a) (2008).
167. Goodwin, supra note 9, at 285-86.
168. Frammolino, supra note 54.
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wealthy white families as to poor black families.
In sum, the experience in the United States with presumed
consent can easily be seen by the public as validation for their fears
that physicians will abuse their authority when families are excluded
from the organ donation decision. Apparently, physicians will take
organs in disregard of people's wishes, and they will do so in a
discriminatory fashion.
To be sure, it is important to remember that all of this discussion
about abuse is not dispositive, but only suggestive. One could argue
that the coroners in Brotherton and Newman would not have abused
their authority if the law had called for presumed consent and
excluded families from participation in the donation decision. After
all, it was the exclusion of families that constituted the primary
abuse by the two coroners.
But whether or not a different approach to presumed consent
would have played out differently, the drafters of the 2006 UAGA
and state legislatures have decided to abandon presumed consent,
and it is difficult to envision a revival of presumed consent in a
stronger version in the near future.
Indeed, even in other countries which have had a better
experience with presumed consent than in the United States, there is
a tremendous reluctance to proceed without family involvement.
C. Presumed Consent Has Not Been More Successful in Other
Countries
Many scholars cite the experience of other countries, particularly
those in Western Europe, as support for presumed consent. However,
close examination indicates that the experience elsewhere also
demonstrates the infeasibility of implementing presumed consent
without the involvement of family members.
Indeed, when Brazil tried to implement a presumed consent
regime in which objections could be lodged only by individuals for
themselves, it provoked a backlash among the public, leading many
people to refuse donation. 169 The public reaction led to the repeal of
the presumed consent law. 170
Studies have considered the impact of presumed consent laws in
other countries, and researchers disagree about the effect of the laws.
Some studies suggest that presumed consent laws do not increase the
likelihood of organ retrieval for transplantation. In one ten-country
169. Claudio Csillag, Brazil Abolishes "Presumed Consent" in Organ Donation, 352
LANCET 1367, 1367 (1998).
170. Id.; see also Everton Bailey, Comment, Should the State Have Rights to Your
Organs? Dissecting Brazil's Mandatory Organ Donation Law, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REv. 707, 708-09 (1999).
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comparison, for example, the authors found that the higher rates of
organ donation in presumed consent countries could be explained by
medical considerations rather than the effects of the presumed
consent laws.171 Other studies suggest that presumed consent laws
do in fact result in higher rates of organ retrieval. In a twenty-two-
country comparison, researchers concluded that presumed consent
statutes may increase organ transplantation by 25-30%. 172 Similarly,
after Singapore adopted presumed consent, liver transplants
increased by 35%. 173
Part of the uncertainty about the impact of presumed consent
laws reflects an important gap between law and practice-doctors in
presumed consent countries typically seek family consent even
though the family's consent is not required. 174 In addition, presumed
consent countries with high retrieval rates employ other measures to
increase the organ supply, and those other measures may be
responsible for the higher rates.175 Spain's high rate of organ
donation, for example, appears to reflect a well-developed organ
transplant system overseen by a national network of specially-
trained and highly-motivated transplant physicians. 176 In fact, while
Spain has the highest donor rate ever reached by a country and its
law calls for presumed consent, doctors always seek family consent,
171. Remco Coppen et al., Opting Out Systems: No Guarantee for Higher Donation
Rates, 18 TRANSPLANTATION INT'L 1275, 1277-78 (2005) (finding that higher donation
rates in presumed consent countries can be explained by higher rates of death from
motor vehicle accidents or other causes that likely will leave the decedent in a
condition suitable for organ donation).
172. Alberto Abadie & Sebastien Gay, The Impact of Presumed Consent Legislation
on Cadaveric Organ Donation: A Cross-Country Study, 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 599, 610
(2006); see also Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302
SCIENCE 1338, 1339 (2003) (finding higher donation rates in presumed consent
countries than in actual consent countries).
173. How-Cheng Low et al., Impact of New Legislation on Presumed Consent on
Organ Donation on Liver Transplant in Singapore: A Preliminary Analysis, 82
TRANSPLANTATION 1234, 1236 (2006).
174. Austria is the one European country where transplant physicians generally do
not obtain family consent. Janssen & Gevers, supra note 1, at 580; Mehlman, supra
note 122, at 40-42. But even there, doctors will respect a family's objection. Gerhard
Aigner, An Overview of Legal Aspects in Organ Transplantation-What Are the Family
Rights?, 9 ANNALS TRANSPLANTATION 11, 14 (2004). Even if physicians seek family
consent in presumed consent countries, the existence of a presumed consent statute
may create an atmosphere more favorable to the giving of consent, or physicians in
presumed consent countries may ask for consent differently, phrasing it in terms of
whether family members know of any objections to donation from the decedent rather
than asking for their permission to retrieve organs. See supra text accompanying notes
70-73.
175. Healy, supra note 69, at 1038-43.
176. Chris Rudge, Organ Donation and the Law, 82 TRANSPLANTATION 1140, 1141
(2006); see also Healy, supra note 69, at 1040-41.
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and they always respect the wishes of the next of kin. 177
In short, the evidence from other countries confirms the
experience in the United States that it is difficult, and perhaps
impossible, to implement presumed consent without family
involvement.
CONCLUSION
Although presumed consent has fallen out of favor in the United
States, this country's experience with that approach leaves some
important lessons.
First, to maximize the number of people who become organ
donors after death, greater efforts must be made to increase the
likelihood that people document their wishes to donate while they
are still alive. Public survey data finds a likelihood of donation close
to 80%, but a documentation rate of just over 50%. If everyone who
would like to donate signs an organ donor card, commits to organ
donation on a driver's license, or otherwise agrees to be a donor,
organ retrieval rates could increase by as much as 50%. 178
Second, greater efforts should be made to overcome the
reluctance of families to agree to donation. In many cases, it appears
that refusals of consent are based on misconceptions (e.g., mistaken
assumptions that organ donation violates religious scruples or that
organ donation would affect the decedent's appearance at an open-
casket funeral). 179 Broader implementation of successful approaches
to discussions with families would be important.180 For example,
researchers have found that families are more likely to consent when
the discussion about the person's death is separated from discussions
about organ donation, when organ procurement professionals
participate with hospital staff in the donation discussion, and when
the request for donation takes place in a quiet, private setting.181
Organ procurement professionals also are experimenting with a
177. RAFAEL MATESANZ & CHRISTOPHER J. RUDGE, The Acute Shortage of Donors: A
UK and European Perspective, in TRANSPLANTATION: A COMPANION TO SPECIALIST
SURGICAL PRACTICE 19, 34-35 (John L.R. Forsythe ed., 3d ed. 2005).
178. Changes in the law, particularly with the 2006 UAGA, are addressing the
problem of family members overriding a decedent's documented desire to be an organ
donor. REV. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 8(a) (2006).
179. Siminoff et al., supra note 84, at 973-76; Laura A. Siminoff et al., Factors
Influencing Families' Consent for Donation of Solid Organs for Transplantation, 286
JAMA 71, 74 tbl.1 (2001).
180. David H. Howard et al., Does Quality Improvement Work? Evaluation of the
Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative, 42 HEALTH SERV. RES. 2160, 2169-70
(2007); Howard K. Koh et al., A Statewide Public Health Approach to Improving Organ
Donation: The Massachusetts Organ Donation Initiative, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 30,
31-34 (2007).
181. Gortmaker et al., supra note 68, at 214.
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"presumptive approach" to consent for organ donation. Traditionally,
health care professionals have taken a value-neutral, balanced
approach in their discussions with family members.182 Under the
presumptive approach, the professional takes a value-positive,
affirmative position about donation and encourages the family to
agree to donation. 183
It is difficult to see a revival of presumed consent in the near
future, given its rejection by the 2006 UAGA. That said, attitudes
might change, especially if the organ shortage continues to worsen.
From the recent rise and fall of presumed consent, what lessons can
we draw about future proposals for presumed consent?
Inasmuch as the abandonment of presumed consent appears to
reflect concerns about professionals abusing their presumed consent
authority, and a system that may have placed a greater burden on
minorities to supply needed organs and tissues, future policies must
avoid these concerns.
Ensuring evenhandedness would require an important change in
presumed consent laws. Instead of limiting presumed consent to
persons under the custody of coroners or medical examiners, states
could make all cadavers subject to presumed consent. While an
important first step, more would need to be done to ensure
evenhandedness. Physicians still could exercise their discretion in a
biased way-even though all deceased persons would be subject to
organ removal, doctors might be more likely to take organs from
minorities. 184 To address this possibility, organ removal would have
to be mandatory for decedents with viable organs in the absence of
an objection, or careful monitoring of organ removal practices would
be needed to detect any racial or other inappropriate biases in organ
retrieval.
Preventing other kinds of abuse of authority is more challenging.
After all, misconduct in the health care system is not limited to
matters involving organs and tissues. Some doctors and hospitals
defraud the Medicare and Medicaid systems; other doctors falsify
research data.
182. Sheldon Zink & Stacey Wertlieb, A Study of the Presumptive Approach to
Consent for Organ Donation: A New Solution to an Old Problem, 26 CRITICAL CARE
NURSE 129, 130 (2006).
183. Id. at 130-31. For a critique of the presumptive approach, see Robert D. Truog,
Consent for Organ Donation-Balancing Conflicting Ethical Obligations, 358 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1209, 1210-11 (2008).
184. Cf. Ira J. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During
Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1204 (1990) (finding similar levels of drug use during
pregnancy by blacks and whites, but that physicians are ten times more likely to
report black women to health authorities).
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A number of measures can reduce the possibility that organs
would be wrongly taken for transplantation. In particular, it would
be important to ensure that professional practices are open to public
scrutiny. If transplant professionals cannot hide what they are doing,
then it is much more difficult to engage in misconduct.
A good model is suggested by some of the requirements for
conducting research on experimental therapies for people in life-
threatening situations where consent to participation in the research
study is not feasible ("emergency research"). To allow for important
research on treatments that would be provided to unconscious or
otherwise incapacitated persons, the Food and Drug Administration
created an exception to informed consent. 8 5 Taking some of the
requirements that must be satisfied if informed consent cannot be
obtained for emergency research, 186 we would end up with several
requirements for a program of presumed consent to organ donation.
The transplant professionals implementing presumed consent in
a community would have to:
. consult with representatives of the community before
implementing presumed consent;
. disclose to the entire community the plans to implement
presumed consent and discuss the implications of presumed consent
for members of the community;
. publicly disclose anonymous data on a regular basis about the
donors and recipients of organs under presumed consent; and
. establish an independent monitoring committee to exercise
oversight of the presumed consent process.
Whether better implementation of presumed consent would lead
to its acceptance is highly uncertain. Presumed consent has never
been a significant basis for taking organs, even when allowed in the
United States, or for that matter, in other countries. On the other
hand, the continual worsening of the organ shortage should increase
public receptivity to new approaches to increasing the organ supply.
In the end, the resolution of this issue may come down to the
question of whether alternative methods to increase the organ supply
are more palatable to the public. 187
185. 21 C.F.R. § 50.24(a)(7) (2008).
186. Id.
187. For example, people might be more comfortable with financial incentives for
organ donation since those preserve individual authority to decide, or with
xenotransplantation (e.g., transplantation with pig kidneys or livers).

